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Abstract 
 
Technology is improving day-by-day and 
so is the usage of mobile devices. Every 
activity that would involve manual and 
paper transactions can now be completed 
in seconds using your fingertips. On one 
hand, life has become fairly convenient 
with the help of mobile devices, whereas 
on the other hand security of the data and 
the transactions occurring in the process 
have been under continuous threat.  This 
paper, re-evaluates the different policies 
and procedures used for preserving the 
privacyof sensitive data and device 
location.. Policy languages have been very 
vital in the mobile environments as they 
can be extended/used significantly for 
sending/receiving any data. 
In the mobile environment users always go 
to service providers to access various 
services. Hence, communications between 
the service providers and mobile handsets 
needs to be secured. Also, the data access 
control needs to be in place. A section of 
this paper will review the communication 
paths and channels and their related access 
criteria.  This paper is a contribution to the 
mobile domain, showing the possible 
attacks related to privacy and the various 
mechanisms used to preserve the end-user 
privacy. In addition, it also gives a 
comparison of the different privacy 
preserving methods in mobile 
environments to provide guidance to the 
readers.  Finally, the paper summarises 
future research challenges in the area of 
privacy preservation. This paper examines 
the ‘where’ problem and in particular, 
examines tradeoffs between enforcing 
location security at a device vs. enforcing 
location security at an edge location 
server. This paper also sketches an 
implementation of location security 
solution at both the device and the edge 
location server and presents detailed 
experiments using real mobility and user 
profile data sets collected from multiple 
data sources (taxicabs, Smartphones).  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Mobile devices have become an important 
tool in modern day communication . 
Mobile and other handheld devices such as 
ipads and tablet PCs have overtaken 
laptops and desktops and hence there has 
been an increasing research interest in the 
area of mobile computing inrecent years. 
This includes areas such as quality of 
communication, usability and the overall 
end-to-end data security in day-to-day 
mobile transactions. Todays’ mobile 
devices continuously connect to different 
service providers for day-to-day online 
activities such as online purchases, online 
banking, social networking and endless 
web surfing.  In addition to this, devices 
could be connecting to the service 
providers to receive or send sensitive 
information. At the Service Provider end, 
the data would be stored and Service 
Provider would only handover the data if it 
confirms that the person requesting it is 
authorized to receive the information. The 
exchange of data from one end of the 
network to the other is a major challenge 
due to the mishandling of the data by a 
malicious user.  Hence the confidentiality 
and integrity of the data needs to be 
protected either by transforming the 
sensitive information into a non-readable 
format or by converting it into a cipher 
text.  
 
Mobile environments are always prone to 
various security vulnerabilities. A number 
of papers highlight the various threats and 
problems due to the large volume of 
transactions occurring in the mobile 
environments [15, 16]. A very popular 
attack on the mobile environment is the 
man-in-the-middle attack. Every bit of data 
that comes into the mobile device and goes 
out of the mobile device can be assumed to 
be sniffed by a malicious user. The 
information can be assumed to be sniffed 
by the man-in-the-middle and manipulated 
in order to retrieve the sensitive 
information. Protecting the information 
that is being exchanged between the 
mobile devices is a major challenge and 
this paper will discuss some of the 
techniques that can be employed to 
mitigate the man-in-the-middle attack. The 
attack discussed above includes a number 
of attacks such as man-in-the-middle, 
sniffing and privacy related attacks. 
Another attack that is described by some 
of the researches is based on the cross 
service attack on the mobile devices [1]. 
Cross service attacks can occur while you 
are browsing from your mobile handset 
sitting in a shop with wireless 
connectivity. The malicious user would be 
monitoring the new connections to the 
wireless network and using an exploit 
published previously he gains access to the 
phone. C Mulliner et al., describes in detail 
the proof-of-concept to show the attack 
and also discusses the way in which the 
vulnerability can be exploited.  
With the increasing availability of mobile 
devices, there is a growing demand for 
location-based applications. In response to 
such a user demand, various location-
based services have been emerging 
recently [23], [26]. 
A very interesting type of attack that has 
been popular in mobile and smartphones is 
the video based attack. All 3G 
smartphones have the bluebooth, camera 
and video capabilities and hence is prone 
to video based vulnerabilities. N Xu et al., 
have come up with stealthy video 
capturing software that captures the user 
behaviour patterns without the owner’s 
knowledge. It then sends the collected 
information into a remote device. This 
attack is executed in such a way that the 
device owner is unaware of the devices 
activities. Stealthy Video Capturer (SVC) 
is a spyware that works very well in all 3G 
smartphones. All it needs is the 3G 
connectivity and the video recording 
capability. This works based on the 
Windows mobile 5.0/6.0 platforms and it 
uses the relevant API's for it’s functioning. 
The three main components of this 
spyware are: Video capture, triggering 
algorithm and file sending. The video 
capture as the name suggests captures the 
video without the knowledge of the mobile 
user. The triggering algorithm identifies 
the precise time to turn on the video 
capturing process and passes on the video 
information. Finally the file sending flow 
is responsible for sending the recorded 
video to a remote device. The video is 
compressed using mobile phone’s video 
compression techniques before it is being 
sent to the remote location.  They also 
discuss the injection method used in SVC. 
As most users today download a lot of 
games from the Internet, the authors in [2] 
found a way of injecting the Trojan using a 
game and to achieve  this they used the tic-
tac-toe game. In this case the owner of the 
mobile device downloads the game and is 
content that he has just received a new 
game. However, he is totally unaware of 
the SVC that has also been downloaded 
together with the game. It can also be 
noted that the CPU, memory and other 
details of the phone needs to be looked at 
before the triggering algorithm captures a 
video. The authors also comment that the 
malware is resistant to all existing 
antivirus tools as it is a new type of 
vulnerability. The key factor contributing 
to the success of SVC is due to the fact 
that there is no efficient management 
policy for system APIs security for 
Windows Mobile. 
In the mobile environment, it is quite 
common to have a man-in-the-middle 
trying to sniff at the information being 
passed between the mobile device and the 
service providers [1]. Therefore it is 
crucial to have data access control 
mechanisms in place. 
It would be interesting to highlight the 
importance of European data protection 
guidelines that has recently undergone 
revisions to include the privacy of 
individual’s data and personally 
identifiable information (PIIs). Some of 
the notable changes include explicit 
consent from the user when data is being 
shared with other third party service 
providers. More transparency about the 
way in which the  data is handled is 
another important change to the European 
Data Privacy Directive.. The reform also 
includes the mandate for complete 
accountability and responsibility of the 
service provider when personal data is 
being processed [43]. 
This review paper mainly covers the 
various methods used for preserving user 
privacy. Hence, it presents a detailed 
review of many methodologies before 
moving onto the open research problems in 
the various solutions described. It then 
moves onto discuss “where to enforce 
security” and shows a novel approach to 
enforce the location security.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows: Section 2 covers the related work. 
Section 3 details the privacy related 
attacks. Section 4 describes the different 
mechanisms and the classification of 
preserving privacy in mobile 
environments.  Sections 5-13discuss the 
different methods of preserving privacy in 
various mobile environments. Section 14 
compares the different mechanisms and 
the drawbacks in the existing solutions. It 
also discusses the open security problems 
and future research directions. Section 15 
describes the location privacy and “where 
to enforce location privacy”. Section 16 
introduces Mobile Microcloud. Section 17 
describes the security matrix. Section 18 
explains the android implementation for 
location privacy. Sections 19 and 20 
includes the conclusion and 
acknowledgement.  
 
2. Related Work 
A number of papers related to mobile 
environments and its vulnerabilities have 
been published in the recent past. Sniffing 
attacks have been talked about in [3]. They 
explore the vulnerability where attackers 
snoop on users by sniﬃng on their mobile 
phone sensors, such as the microphone, 
camera, and GPS receiver.  
[13] discusses about Soundcomber, which 
is a stealthy Trojan with innocuous 
permissions that can sense the context of 
its audible surroundings to target and 
extract a very small amount of high-value 
data.  As sensor-rich smartphones become 
more ubiquitous, sensory malware has the 
potential to breach the privacy of 
individuals at mass scales. There have 
been a number of different papers 
concentrating on the different 
vulnerabilities of mobile devices and how 
the operating system in the device allows 
users to control access to sensitive 
information including location, camera 
images, and contacts. In [14] authors have 
introduced TaintDroid, which operates as 
an efficient system wide information flow-
tracking tool. This tool has the capability 
of tracking multiple sources of sensitive 
data. The authors also studied the 
behaviour of thirty popular third party 
applications chosen at random from 
Android marketplace and concluded that 
two-thirds of those applications display 
suspicious handling of sensitive data. 
A paper is dedicated to the mobile phone 
vulnerabilities, which talks about the 
different malwares that are targeted on the 
mobile devices [15]. The paper details on 
how some of the malwares can be 
implemented easily in order to make the 
mobile phones vulnerable to attacks. 
Preventing the cell phones from malicious 
users or infiltrators is very important and 
there have been a number of research 
papers concentrating on the same.  In [16], 
VirusMeter is detailed which detects 
existence of malware with abnormal power 
consumption. VirusMeter relies on a 
concise lightweight user-centric power 
model and aims to detect mobile malware 
in two modes: While the real-time 
detection mode provides immediate 
detection, running VirusMeter under the 
battery-charging mode can further improve 
the detection accuracy without concerns 
about resource consumption. Using real-
world malware the authors have 
experimentally shown that VirusMeter can 
effectively and efficiently detect their 
existence. 
In [12] authors adapted a special and 
feasible method, blind signature, to 
generate an authorized anonymous ID that 
replaces the real ID of an authorized 
mobile device. They presented a two-phase 
protocol to address location privacy, 
however, did not consider that the 
randomness introduced during the blinding 
phase can be removed easily. They also 
prove that the administrator can link real 
ID with authorized anonymous ID. In 
addition to this they propose an improved 
registration and re-confusion protocol 
using the same cryptographic technique, 
blind signature based on bilinear pairings. 
A considerable amount of research work 
has been carried out in the area of location-
based applications. In [18], authors 
propose a security model for location 
based services using outsourced databases 
and demonstrate how one can use 
distributed storage and international 
mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) as user 
identification to secure the location data. 
In [19], the authors investigated the 
problem of protecting location privacy of 
mobile users in the setting of ubiquitous 
computing. They find it challenging, as 
there are various requests that are forced 
by the organisation and the users. In papers 
[19], [21] authors proposed an authorized-
anonymous-ID based scheme, which is 
used to replace the real ID of an authorized 
mobile device. With authorized-
anonymous-IDs, they also designed an 
architecture that is able to provide the 
mobile users with complete control over 
their location privacy and still allowing the 
organisation to authenticate the mobile 
users. In [20], the authors have designed 
novel protocols to provide location-based 
services, which do not require a user to 
trust a third party. They also analyzed a 
class of location-based services that do not 
directly transfer user locations.  
L Barkhuus et al., discusses users’ concerns 
about the location-based services that 
would disclose their location and in turn 
user’s privacy [22]. In this paper, the 
authors have presented two types of 
location-based services, location-tracking 
and position-aware services. They have 
shown a case study that examines user’s 
concern for privacy in relation to location-
based services and compared people’s 
perceived usefulness of the two types of 
services. The paper concludes that the 
concerns are more when third parties are 
tracking a user’s location. 
 Location based services with privacy as 
the main concern has been described in 
[23, 26, and 34]. In [23], authors have 
refined the mix zone model, describing a 
quantifiable metric of location privacy 
from the point of view of the attacker. In 
[25], the authors discuss the issues in the 
location-aware mobile devices in context 
by addressing the basic technology issues 
involved. They also discuss issues that are 
possible and not possible in the future. 
Further they outline privacy issues that 
arise from the conjunction of technical 
feasibility and government/marketplace 
activities that might use location 
information. In this paper a representative 
sample of important issues is enumerated 
and discussed. Regulation is then 
discussed as a broader term covering the 
various entities and agencies that might 
structure and regulate the use of location 
information and provide the appropriate 
levels of privacy protection to constituents 
while promoting appropriate advances in 
new products and services. 
Other challenges such as user privacy are 
also important in ubiquitous environments. 
Privacy related efforts have been made in 
the past [30]. Research has been carried 
out around privacy awareness systems that 
allow certain privileges to data collectors 
[24]. Karyda and Gritzalis [31] listed some 
of the challenges in this area and the future 
research directions.   
 
 
3. Possible privacy related attacks 
 
There has been a number of privacy 
related attacks that have come into 
existence today. One of the attacks is a 
sensor sniffing attack in which it assumes 
that the threat model is where the attackers 
are able to install malicious software onto 
the devices. This can be done by exploiting 
the software vulnerabilities or by tricking 
to install untrusted code. It is also assumed 
that the attacker has no physical access to 
the device but can receive the sensor date 
through voice or data channels. More 
details about this can be found in the paper 
by L Cai [3].  
A number of viruses have been created to 
exploit the vulnerabilities that exist on 
today’s mobile devices. One of the viruses, 
which originated in Spain, sends text 
messages to random mobile phone 
numbers [15]. As mobile phones become 
more and more intelligent the attacks 
against them will keep increasing. A 
number of vulnerabilities have been 
exploited using the Bluetooth capability of 
mobile devices leading to exposure of 
personal data [15]. Another potential 
attack that has been in existence is stealing 
user’s personal data and downloading it 
without the consent of the mobile owner 
[15].  
Another area of attacks relating to the 
privacy of mobile devices is through 
Trojan applications. A number of Trojan 
applications have been created which gets 
installed onto the mobile device and starts 
exploiting and misusing the capabilities. 
[15] details some of the vulnerabilities that 
are used to exploit mobile phones and the 
breach of privacy through them. A very 
recent report highlighted that Google’s 
Android phones are vulnerable to privacy 
attacks [44]. The vulnerability results from 
the use of unencrypted wireless networks 
like Wi-Fi to log into various Google 
services such as contacts, calendar and 
services like Picasa. When users request a 
digital certificate to sign into these services 
without re-typing the login information, 
Google’s servers relay an authentication 
token back to the user’s phone. This 
allows the user to be able to log into the 
accounts for 2 weeks without having to re-
login. This sounds like a matter of 
convenience to the user but it has turned 
out to be a security flaw due to the fact that 
the authentication token is sent out in plain 
text. Malicious users can track the 
unsecured network and capture the 
authentication token thus allowing access 
to various services leading to a total breach 
of privacy.  
Anxieties about smartphone application 
privacy were raised after the makers of 
Path and Hipster apps admitted uploading 
user contact data without explicit consent 
[45] of the data owners.  
Twitter also updated its privacy policy 
over concerns about how its mobile app 
used address book information. And recent 
reports have led to similar fears about the 
way in which some of the applications 
accessed private information. 
IT can be noted that GSMA has provided 
guidelines to the application developers 
asking them to respect the privacy of the 
users [45]. The guidelines recommend that 
the users be informed of exactly who 
would access what information and with 
whom the information would be shared for 
what purpose.  
One of the recent news also highlighted 
the fact that companies such as Google 
fails to meet the European Union’s data 
protection laws [44]. This is of great 
concern and hence it is very important to 
use adequate guidelines and policies, 
which would help in maintaining the 
privacy of the user and the user’s sensitive 
information.  
 
Android is a core delivery platform 
providing ubiquitous services for 
connected smartphone paradigm, thus 
monetary gains have prompted malware 
authors to employ various attack vectors to 
target Android. Due to large increase in 
unique malware app signature(s) and 
limited capabilities within Android 
environment, signature based methods are 
not sufficient against unseen, 
cryptographic and transformed code. 
Researchers have proposed various 
behavioral approaches to guard the 
centralized app markets as malware 
authors are targeting easy-to-reach-user 
online distribution mechanism. Issues such 
as malware penetration and stealth 
techniques exist. Signature based methods 
can be easily circumvented using code 
obfuscation necessitating a new signature 
for each malware variant [47], forcing the 
anti-malware client to regularly update its 
signature database. 
Static and dynamic approaches are 
currently been worked out by the research 
community for  malware analysis and 
detection. Although these approaches can 
be used independently each one of these 
techniques comes with its own limitations. 
There is not a single technical solution that 
can address all the known vulnerabilities. 
To tackle wide variety of new malware, a 
comprehensive evaluation framework 
incorporating robust static and dynamic 
methods can be proposed on Android 
platform. Manual analysis has become 
infeasible due to the exponential increase 
in the number of unknown malware 
samples. Recent research has proposed an 
automated, hybrid approach for Android 
malware analysis [ref]. 
 
4. Classification of preserving privacy in 
mobile environments 
 
The below architecture shows the 
complete classification of the different 
techniques used to preserve the privacy in 
mobile environments. It defines the 
problems involved as well as the 
techniques proposed to overcome these 
shortcomings. The privacy techniques are 
classified under two main headings: (1) 
Data privacy and (2) Contextual privacy. 
Data privacy mainly involves the data that 
is being transmitted to and from the mobile 
device. This data could be in the form of a 
message, text, or information. The data 
could be sensitive information or it could 
even be a confirmation on some booking 
that was done for an online shopping.  
Figure 1 shows the privacy classifications 
and within the data privacy section it 
shows the 2 main areas of problems, i.e. 
the mobile query and the mobile resources. 
The mobile query could request the service 
providers for information that could be 
sensitive in nature. Hence this has always 
been a problem to understand and hence 
preserve the privacy of the information 
being passed. 
In addition to this, the data confidentiality 
is guaranteed through authentication. The 
other area of classification of privacy is 
based on  contextual privacy. 
Contextual privacy can be further divided 
into location privacy and identity privacy.  
 
  Fig 1 Classification of privacy preservation mechanisms in mobile environments 
 
 
When mobile user requests for static 
resources or mobile resources, pseudo –
identifiers are sent and location is 
anonymized. The data that is being 
transmitted is protected against third party 
malicious users. Although the information 
can be assumed at all times to be hijacked 
by malicious users, malicious users protect 
the data against unauthorised access. This 
is achieved by using data access control 
mechanisms such as P3P policy extension 
and XACML policies.  
These are described in detail in the later 
sections. Location privacy mainly deals 
with the location of the requester. In 
mobile environments, users are frequently 
requested for their location information 
when they try to access a new online 
service.For example, when a user requests 
for nearby restaurant information from a 
location-based server, the location based 
server needs to know the location of the 
user and hence the location information is 
normally requested. However, in most of 
the cases, the user doesn’t want to disclose 
the location information to arbitrary 
location based service providers. This can 
be achieved by a number of different 
mechanisms. To briefly name the 
mechanisms here as shown in the 
architecture diagram above, let’s start with 
k-anonymity. In this method, user’s 
location information is updated with 
pseudo-IDs and then the generalized 
location information is sent to the location 
based service provider. Due to some 
groups being created that fail to provide 
overall anonymity, another mechanism 
called s-proximity has been implemented 
[35]. This mechanism creates a larger 
number of anonymous user profiles to 
ensure that the location based service 
provider cannot identify the location of the 
requestor. Another location privacy 
mechanism that is described in this paper 
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is Casper [36]. Casper is a combination of 
location anonymizer and privacy aware 
query processor. Few other mechanisms 
like the encrypted data store [6], key 
agreement [8], privacy tools [7], In-device 
spatial cloaking assisted by cloud [42] are 
also part of the location privacy and are 
described in detail in the future sections.  
Contextual privacy has another 
classification namely Identity Privacy. 
Identity privacy mainly talks about the 
user/mobile server requestor who issues 
the requests. In order to preserve the 
identity of the user who issues the 
requests, a number of mechanisms have 
been explored. They are mainly user 
profile pseudo-identifier conversion, 
privacy aware query processor and 
authentication based methods. Each one of 
them is detailed in further sections. 
 
5. Profile Anonymization Model 
 
Preserving privacy using anonymization 
has been discussed in a number of research 
papers [35, , 39, 40, and 41]. The authors 
in [38] have looked at the k-anonymity in 
order to generalise the location. The user 
of a mobile device usually requests 
information for 2 main types of resources 
namely static resources and mobile 
resources. In case of static resources, 
pseudo-identifiers are sent and the location 
is anonymized. In the case of mobile 
resources, IDs are updated with pseudo-ids 
and then the generalized location and 
profile are sent back to the requestor. 
Figure 2 shows the representation of this 
k-anonymity model.  
It shows how the mobile device makes a 
request to one of the location service 
providers asking for a location-based 
service. The anonymizer and the location 
information pick this up and the mobile 
user information is anonymized and is then 
transmitted to the location service 
provider. In this way the user and location 
information are hidden. 
 
 
Fig 2 k-anonymity model 
 
Although the profile anonymization model 
works well using the k-anonymity, there 
have been a number of attacks that can be 
performed on the k-anonymity model that 
has led to the identification of the query 
issuer in the location based services. To 
overcome some of the shortcomings in the 
current k-anonymity model the s-
proximity model was proposed.  The next 
section discusses the advantages of the s-
proximity compared to k-anonymity 
model. 
 
6. Identity inference protection using  
s-proximity in Location Based Services 
 
The k-anonymity model as described in the 
previous section tries to hide the location 
of the query issuer who tried to request for 
location based information from the 
Location Service Provider (LSP). [35] 
shows that the k-anonymity is not enough 
as it can be easily prone to attacks thus 
resulting in the re-identification of the 
query requester. Two main attacks that 
have been depicted in the paper are 
heterogeneity attack and conformity 
attacks. K-anonymity can create groups 
that fail to provide the overall anonymity 
due to lack of sufficient match among 
members with respect to some sensitive 
user attribute. The communication 
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between the query requester and the LSP is 
as follows: Initially, the user sends a 
location-based query to the Location 
Anonymizer (LA), which then replaces the 
exact location with a Cloaked Region 
(CR). It is then passed on to the LSP.  The 
attacks prove that in this process, by some 
combined work by the LSP’s or an LSP 
can individually break down the 
anonymity set and prove the identification 
of the specific query requester in cases 
where the query is specific or not too 
generic. Hence [35] comes up with a 
solution that generalizes the query and 
hence makes it difficult for the LSP to 
identify the actual query requester. This is 
achieved in the s-proximity model. The 
paper suggests that both k-anonymity and 
s-proximity are needed to anonymize the 
query requester’s identity in a location-
based service. In the s-proximity model, 
the LA is replaced by context aware LA 
with further modules such as query 
generalization, query analyser and 
partitioning agent. With the detailed 
implementation of privacy of the user is 
preserved and hence the privacy 
preservation is achieved in allocation-
based environments. 
 
7. Casper: Query processing without 
compromising privacy 
 
The method addresses the user having to 
give away the location information while 
requesting for any location-based services 
through a location based database server. 
Casper involves two main components 
namely, location anonymizer and privacy 
aware query processor. The paper [36] 
describes in detail how exactly the two 
main components performs with regard to 
the four novel areas of scalability, quality, 
efficiency and flexibility. Casper functions 
mainly in the following manner. When the 
mobile user sends the location information 
along with the query request for a 
particular location based service, the 
location anonymizer picks it up and blurs 
the location information to a spatial region 
along with the query and passes it to the 
location based database server. The 
privacy aware query processor that is built 
into the location based database server and 
it looks at the request and returns a set of 
answers that matches the mobile users 
query. The architecture diagram shows the 
mobile device making a request to the 
location based service provider. This is 
passed through the anonymizer and into 
the location based database server.  The 
anonymizer does its task and the privacy 
aware query processor performs its 
function and the most relevant out of the 
four data and query would be passed on to 
the location based service providers.  
 
                         Fig 3 Casper model 
 
The authors [36] also point out to three 
novel types of data and query that it 
handles. According to them all the 
traditional anonymizers can only work on 
the public query over public data. In [36], 
the authors propose three novel areas of 
transactions namely, private query over 
public data, public query over private data 
and private query over private data. A 
detailed analysis of the three methods is 
shown and the authors assess its 
performance and scalability.  
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According to the authors, using the 
Casper’s novel solution, the location 
information will never be compromised. 
They also address another level of 
anonymizer called the adaptive location 
anonymizer, which works, similar to the 
original location anonymizer with some 
differences. Details can be found in  [36]. 
 
 
8. P3P policy for data access control 
 
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is a 
policy that is normally used in websites to 
negotiate before displaying any webpage 
to the requester. [5] has extended this to be 
used in mobile and ubiquitous 
environments. The solution proposes to 
extend P3P policy for controlling the data 
access in the mobile device. Modifying the 
P3P policy and using it in the security 
capsule of a mobile handset achieved this. 
Security capsule is a software application 
used in mobile devices [5] and it 
implements security services to protect 
sensitive data in transit and storage. 
A detailed trust establishment mechanism 
between the security capsule, identity 
provider and service provider can be found 
in our previous publication [32]. Mobile 
devices contact the service providers for 
various services and hence the transaction 
between the mobile device and service 
provider involves transfer of sensitive 
information. The service provider can 
publish the P3P policy in the Web Service 
and request the mobile client for the user 
preferences. With the usage of P3P in the 
mobile device, the access to the data is 
controlled including the user preferences 
and identity mapping.  It is also shown in 
the paper [5] that the Service Provider data 
will always be encrypted and successfully 
decrypting the data at the mobile end 
would be a challenge. Hence using P3P 
policy extension together with encryption 
and decryption the data access control is 
maintained.  
 
Fig 4 P3P model for data access control 
 
There are some extensions that need to be 
performed on the P3P policy in order to 
make it work for mobile environments. 
The process of achieving the privacy and 
hence data access control can be briefed 
here as follows: The mobile will first 
request the sensitive information from the 
Service Provider and the Service Provider 
will send an encrypted format of the data 
to the mobile device. The primary 
challenge is to provide controlled and 
appropriate data access control to the right 
user. This is based on the real time key that 
is received from the service provider. The 
service provider sends the data/information 
requested by the mobile device in an 
encrypted format. The real-time key is 
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used to encrypt the data and the mobile 
device requires this real-time key to access 
the data. In order to receive the real time 
key, the mobile client needs to first 
provide the appropriate user preferences 
based on the P3P policy of the service 
provider. The mobile device needs to 
decrypt the data in order to read the 
confidential information or in order to 
access particular information that is 
sensitive. The mobile client then requests 
the real time key from the Service 
Provider. The Service Provider uses this 
real time key in order to encrypt the 
sensitive information. In response to this, 
the Service Provider sends the challenge 
request with its P3P policy. The security 
capsule in the mobile device responds to 
this with the challenge response and P3P 
user preferences. On the mobile side, 
Service Provider’s policy file is parsed and 
the identity information that is needed 
from the mobile device is retrieved. This 
identity known to the device is then hashed 
and sent to the Service Provider. In the 
Service Provider side the hashing is carried 
out and the result is used as the key to 
encrypt the real time key. Similar method 
is adapted on the mobile side and the real 
time key is retrieved. This leads to 
decrypting the sensitive information. The 
whole process ensures that the person with 
the correct access rights is the one who 
will receive the information. 
 
 
9. XACML policy in mobile 
environment 
 
XACML (eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language) is a simple, flexible 
way to express and enforce access control 
policies in a variety of environments, using 
a single language. The XACML language 
in effect protects content from 
unauthorized use in enterprise data 
exchanges. XACML is mainly derived 
around and written in, XML, which is 
understood in most global environments. 
OASIS, which drives the development, 
convergence, and adoption of e-business 
standards, has ratified XACML. XACML 
gives an extensive and powerful set of 
features to the developers. XACML is 
used to verify the data access control [5] in 
mobile environments.  The paper [5] talks 
about XACML and its two main 
components PDP and PEP. Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP) protects the 
resource when a request is made and sends 
it to Policy Decision Point (PDP), it then 
looks at the request and makes the decision 
based on the access permissions.  
The process involved in XACML policy 
for mobile environment can be briefed as 
follows. In response to the initial request, 
the service provider will send a challenge 
request and a request created by PEP for 
XACML policy from the mobile device. 
The mobile client will send the XACML 
policy with the relevant details in it. Web 
Services will then pass the request through 
the PDP, which will look at the request 
and decide whether the request is eligible 
to be granted access to the information. 
Based on the decision made by the PDP, 
Web Services encrypts the real time key 
and sends it as a response to the mobile 
device. The key is then decrypted in the 
mobile device and the original information 
is retrieved.  
 
10. Encrypted data store to preserve 
privacy 
 
Location based social applications (LBSA) 
are used considerably in today’s 
smartphones. Smartphones using these 
applications send location information to 
untrusted third party servers. In [6] the 
authors argue that the LBSAs should adapt 
an approach where the untrusted third-
party servers are treated simply as 
encrypted data stores, and the application 
functionality be moved to the client 
devices. The location coordinates are 
encrypted, when shared, and can be 
decrypted only by the users that the data is 
intended for. This approach significantly 
improves user location privacy. The 
authors also argue that this approach not 
only improves privacy, but also is also 
flexible enough to support a wide variety 
of location-based applications used today. 
Location information can be easily 
accessed by the third party servers and 
hence can be passed on to other sources 
due to various reasons as mentioned in [6].  
In [6], the authors propose a design for 
building LBSAs that provides a low-cost, 
practical, and deployable alternative to 
existing design while providing strong user 
location privacy. The key insight behind 
this design is to treat the server as a simple 
encrypted data store, and move the 
application functionality to the client’s 
smartphone. All the location information 
shared is encrypted and the lack of plain 
location information on the storage server 
improves user privacy. This approach 
easily works on today’s smartphones 
because the servers running LBSAs today 
provide their service by running simple 
operations such as certain database or hash 
table lookups, performing simple 
computations on the location data, and 
sending the results to be displayed on the 
clients terminals. For example, in a nearby 
restaurant review application, the server 
takes the user location, finds restaurants 
that are in the vicinity of the user’s 
location, queries the reviews of these 
restaurants, and sends the results back to 
the users for display. In the proposed 
approach, the data storage and lookup 
operations happen on encrypted data but 
still remain on the storage server. The 
clients receive the encrypted results, 
decrypt and display the results to the users. 
The clients only incur an additional cost of 
decrypting the received content, and 
perform simple calculations on the 
decrypted data. 
  
Figure 5 shows that friends exchange 
friendship proofs and store them in their 
devices and then users generate and store 
the transaction proofs in the server and this 
is later on retrieved by their friends. 
By using lightweight cryptographic 
schemes such as encryption, decryption 
with real time keys, the authors claim that 
they can easily move the functionality to 
the smartphones and provide services 
while preserving privacy. The paper 
discusses two proofs namely, friendship 
proof and transaction proof. 
 
Fig 5 Encrypted data store model 
 
Friendship proofs cryptographically attest 
the social connection (or friendship) 
between two users, and similarly, 
transaction proofs cryptographically attest 
certain data generated by a user. Using 
these proofs, any user in the network can 
verify if it is a friend, and if so decrypt the 
data generated a piece of data. But no 
other user other than a friend will be able 
to see the contents. Finally, the interface 
exposed by the storage server is narrow 
enough that one can reason about the 
privacy guarantees, and yet they are 
flexible enough to build several LBSAs. 
As a result, a single storage server can 
support many different LBSAs.  
 
11. Unified framework for location 
privacy 
 
According to paper [7] there are three 
entities that play a role in preserving 
location privacy: users, applications, and 
privacy tools. Each entity controls the 
amount of shared information and thus 
affects user privacy. Users and 
applications might intentionally (e.g., by 
being cautious about sharing unnecessary 
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information) or unintentionally (e.g., by 
sharing incorrect information) reduce the 
amount of information revealed. Privacy 
policies influence the way applications can 
share information with different entities, 
and they are applied to the application 
based on the users' decisions. Various 
privacy tools [7], also, use sophisticated 
algorithms to guarantee users' privacy. In 
order to capture the effect of the three 
entities in preserving location privacy of 
users, in [7], they abstract the entities and 
model a location-privacy preserving 
mechanism as a single unit that separates 
actual events of the users and the 
adversary. Paper [7] defines a location-
privacy preserving mechanism as a 
transformation function that modifies the 
users' actual events before they can 
become observable by any observer. The 
paper discusses the privacy tools in detail. 
 
 
     Fig 6 Location privacy with privacy tools 
 
Privacy tools work in three architectures: 
(i) Distributed (user-side): They can work 
in a distributed way by being implemented 
on individual mobile devices, where each 
device transforms its events and modifies 
what an observer can see about the user's 
spatio-temporal state. This can be done 
either with the help of information that a 
device gets from other devices or 
exclusively with the information that the 
user has. (ii) Centralized (server-side): 
They can work in a centralized manner by 
using a trusted central server that acts as a 
privacy preserving proxy and modifies 
users' messages (correspond to events in 
our model) before being observable by an 
untrusted entity. (iii) Hybrid: They can be 
a hybrid of both distributed and centralized 
architectures.  
The four main functions in the location 
privacy preserving mechanism include 
hiding events, adding dummy events, 
obfuscation and anonymization.  
 
12. Authentication and key agreement 
for location privacy 
 
 A Loukas et al. discussed in their paper 
[8] about mobile instant locator with 
chatting capability along with preserving 
privacy and security. Mobile instant 
locator with chatting (MILC) was 
developed for usage within a closed 
community and hence worked very well in 
the University scenario described in the 
paper. The paper [8] also highlights that 
with its popularity grew its demand and 
since it also incorporated privacy 
preserving techniques it was very 
attractive to other communities too. MILC 
works towards making the communication 
confidential and maintaining the privacy of 
the user. According to [8] the MILC server 
is developed in Java. The client server 
communications are handled using the 
RSA 1024 bit asymmetric keys. Client gets 
successfully authenticated with the server 
and from then onwards every 
communication between the two ends is 
secured by using a symmetric session key 
created at the server end. The paper [8] 
proves that supporting pseudonymity and 
location privacy can preserve the end-user 
privacy. The option of presenting or 
disclosing the location is left to the choice 
of the user. If the user decides not to 
disclose the location, user’s privacy is 
maintained.  Pseudonymity is provided per 
session. When the user connects to the 
MILC server is offered with the option of 
choosing a different pseudonym for the 
current session. In the paper [8], authors 
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have also compared MILC with three other 
applications [9], [10], [11] and show how 
comparison based on security 
requirements. The comparison is based on 
the following six basic criteria; mutual 
Authentication, confidentiality, integrity, 
pseudonymity, resistance to DoS (Denial 
of Service) caused by insiders and location 
privacy. The comparative view of all the 
applications considering the above 
mentioned seven basic criteria show that 
the applications support user 
authentication and pseudonymity. MILC 
additionally provides mutual client–server 
authentication. Moreover, the pseudonym 
of a MILC user cannot be associated with 
the permanent identity in any way. On the 
contrary, this is not true for any IM or IRC 
platform. Excluding MILC, BuddyMob is 
the only one supporting location privacy, 
but this applies for guest users only. 
 
 
13. In-device spatial cloaking assisted by 
Cloud 
 
A number of privacy mechanisms 
proposed mostly deal with single point of 
service and when there is a single point of 
service, things are bound to go wrong 
somehow somewhere. Song and Sean [42] 
talks about the cloud services available 
that makes it so much more versatile in 
terms of the services being available in the 
cloud. The authors describe how the 
location based services that are requested 
by the mobile device are delivered to them 
by means of using spatial cloaking that is 
assisted by cloud capabilities. There are 
clients in the mobile devices that would be 
responsible for generating the cloaking 
region. The main difference of the In-
device spatial cloaking solution in 
comparison to the Casper solution is that 
here it is the device generating the cloaked 
region and hence the paper strongly 
portrays that using the in-device cloaking 
Privacy can be preserved and with a 
minimum of times the device 
communicates with the cloud. The in-
device spatial cloaking solution involves 
alocation-trusted server. This location 
trusted server takes the location 
information from the mobile device strips 
that information and carries only the 
spatial cloaked information and the service 
request and passes it on to the service 
provider. 
The solution needs the grid structure to be 
kept inside the memory of the mobile 
device and this grid structure needs to be 
up-to-date with the device. The paper 
proposes a top down cloaking algorithm in 
comparison to the bottom up approach of 
Casper model. 
 
14. Open problems 
 
There are a number of challenges and 
loopholes in each of the privacy preserving 
techniques described in this paper. The 
individual papers highlight the drawbacks 
or the challenges in the proposed solutions. 
The k-anonymity solution described in the 
paper has a number of issues associated 
with it. With the limited number of 
profiles created, it becomes easy for the 
location service providers to easily track 
down the actual requestor and further 
identify the location of the requestor. This 
problem is clearly explained with an 
example in [35] which further proposes s-
proximity. The s-proximity solution 
overcomes the problem of location service 
provider identifying the requestor and 
location when there are a certain large 
number of profiles. However, if this large 
number of profiles is not large enough, 
then the same problem as k-anonymity will 
start to appear.  Casper model that is 
spoken about in this paper has a location 
based database server and an anonymizer, 
which takes care of different types of data 
over different queries. It is important to 
note that the database server is a single 
service and hence can be prone to a 
number of attacks. Hence Casper solution 
needs to be further enhanced. With the P3P 
and XACML policy extension 
mechanisms described in this paper, there 
are obvious limitations of P3P and 
XACML. Hence negotiation between the 
server and the mobile device needs to be 
implemented using a policy language that 
ensures compatibility on the server side 
and within the mobile applications 
requirement. The focus for future work in 
these two mechanisms will be to come up 
with a novel policy language for the 
enforcement and policy negotiation 
between the Web Service and the mobile 
device before transferring any sensitive 
information to the device.  In the encrypted 
data store mechanism described in this 
paper, the challenge is to extend the 
solution with new mechanisms for users to 
securely discover the keys used to encrypt 
the data on the server, without revealing 
the key to the server itself.  This is an area, 
which can be further explored by the 
scientific community. The privacy tools 
mechanism focuses on the location unified 
framework used for preserving the 
location. With the unified framework, 
there are certain challenges due to the 
emerging threats related to time and 
location. The solution has some problems 
with the accuracy of the location privacy 
metrics. This helps us to focus on future 
research in location privacy and its 
elements including anonymity. MILC 
technique is used in a small scale in a 
University environment and hence this 
solution works well in a closed 
community. However, when the solution is 
proposed to be used across a wider 
community, the risks of security and 
privacy are high.  Hence this solution 
needs to be looked into much more detail 
in terms of the location privacy and 
scalability. The specification of user being 
able to decide whether to give away the 
information of his location seems to be 
much more complicated in an enterprise 
setup. This section has been mainly written 
to summarise the challenges and to list 
down the open issues. The In-device 
spatial cloaking module that is assisted by 
the cloud solution is a good start to a 
solution based on cloud services. This 
solution talks about the location trusted 
server being in the cloud and the mobile 
device itself generating the spatial 
cloaking with the help of the up-to-date 
grid structure. With this solution, it would  
again be different to accurately make the 
grid capabilities to up to date. 
 
15.  What, How and Where of Location 
Privacy? 
 
There are 3 main questions to be answered 
when we consider location privacy. What 
needs to be preserved and how privacy can 
be preserved – these two questions are the 
standard ones that all researchers have 
addressed. The review work that has been 
described so far in the paper all relates to 
what and how.  
But the one question that has not been 
addressed before is “Where to enforce 
Privacy?”  
Our attempt at exploring ways to find out 
where exactly privacy needs to be enforced 
has led us to conclude that an edge based 
solution is where privacy should be 
enforced. 
 
This section focuses on Device Vs. Edge 
based implementation and the tradeoffs in 
them. This section quantifies the tradeoffs 
and proves that edge based solution is the 
better solution for enforcing security. Our 
results show that while device-based 
solutions do not require trust in the edge 
location server, they either suffer from 
high false positive rate (about 25% 
probability of not meeting the desired 
security requirement) or low utility (about 
600 meters higher error in obfuscated 
location data). 
 
Solution at the Core 
The core is the centralized network and 
hence has a lot of bandwidth and can 
maintain huge repository of information. It 
also has a lot of computational power 
allowing it to process complex solutions. It 
is important to note that it takes longer 
time for transactions to work between the 
device and the core. This is a major 
drawback to the location-based solution, as 
decisions need to be made rapidly else will 
lead to delays in the decisions to be taken 
and hence weakens the system. Solution at 
the core will retain same false positive and 
false negative and will have a very high 
latency. 
 
Solution on the Device 
The delays caused due to the solution 
being placed at the core of the network 
gave rise to the new wave of solutions that 
were placed on the device. It is important 
to notice that the device doesn’t have a lot 
of flexibility, bandwidth, and computation 
power. Besides any of these, the device 
does not have visibility of the other 
devices in the network. Hence any kind of 
computations performed by the device will 
not be leading to accurate results. It could 
very well lead to misleading answers to the 
user’s request. 
This leads us to the new methodology that 
we introduce in this paper called the 
solution at the edge of the network.  
 
Solution at the Edge 
The edge of the network is closer to the 
device and is an intermediate channel 
between the device and the core of the 
network. The edge has visibility of all the 
other users in the network and the edge can 
perform computations faster and provide 
with results spontaneously to the device. 
The advantage of having the solution at the 
edge is that edge will have information 
about other people and hence solution will 
have lower false positive and lower false 
negative. The only catch with this solution 
is that trust with the edge is needed. The 
edge will have the raw obfuscated data or 
slightly obfuscated location data. Latency 
with this solution is higher than device 
based solution and is lower than the 
solution at the core. This helps the device 
user make decisions on the location based 
service requests that one has. Hence this 
solution is the best solution compared to 
the three solutions explained. 
 
16. Mobile Microcloud 
Introducing mobile micro-cloud in this 
paper will help in understanding the 
placement of the solution. Mobile micro-
cloud [46] envisions that applications (or 
computing tasks) will be deployed in a 
mobile micro-cloud, a logical network 
composed of two components, the core 
(e.g., the command and control center) 
with access to large quantities of static 
(and possibly stale) information and the 
edge (e.g., the forward operating base) 
with access to smaller quantities of more 
real-time and dynamic data. The edge and 
core are separated by dynamic and 
performance constrained networks with a 
many-to-one relationship between the core 
and the edge. It is also possible for edge 
nodes to communicate with each other. 
Further, the (edge and core) nodes can 
belong to different coalition partners, 
raising the question of security and 
operational policies for handling of data 
and computation.  
 
 
 
Fig 7 A tactical network scenario enabling 
efficient computations over dynamic networks 
 
Figure 7 illustrates a typical architecture of 
the mobile micro- cloud in the army 
coalition context. The benefits of 
embedding storage and computation into 
such a micro-cloud tactical network are 
two fold: (i) Effective provisioning for 
diverse information requirements the 
micro- cloud supports users with different 
latency requirements and access rights and 
(ii) Effective information exchange in a 
constrained environment. Complete 
shuffling of information is impractical in a 
tactical network and the micro-cloud 
reduces congestion by providing 
computation at the edge. 
Privacy solutions could also work in a 
cloud based environment but a Microcloud 
based solution will have low latency in 
comparison to the cloud based solution, 
however, if the cloud based solution can 
avoid low latency and can be placed 
somewhere near the device, the solution 
would still be technically correct. 
 
 
17. Security Metrics 
This section presents an empirical 
evaluation of the proposed location 
information flow control solution. Table 1 
shows a summary of the datasets used for 
evaluation. Three of the datasets Shanghai, 
San Francisco and Stockholm are taxicab 
traces obtained from the respective cities. 
The fourth (Cellular) is a user location 
trace and URL accesses obtained from a 
cellular network. The fifth (Watson) is an 
enterprise dataset obtained from WiFi 
location traces and URL accesses. 
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0 
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mon
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trips 
1,335,
360 
26,767 570,69
0 
55,2
00 
- 
Total 
number of 
web 
accesses 
- - - 12.4 
M 
5.6M 
Table 1 Summary of datasets 
 
In the Shanghai and San Francisco 
datasets, there are explicit markers that 
indicate when the taxicab is occupied; in 
the Stockholm dataset collection of 
location traces is turned off when the 
taxicab is occupied (i.e., we only have 
trajectory information when the taxicab is 
not occupied). We use these datasets to 
quantify tradeoffs between the extent of 
obfuscation and anonymity. 
In addition to these datasets, we use 
coarse-grained mobility data from 16K 
mobile users obtained from CDRs (Call 
Detail 2Records) and from about 1.2K 
enterprise users obtained from WiFi and 
web data accesses. While a taxicab’s 
trajectory may be viewed as a mixture of 
several user trajectories (i.e., multiple 
passenger trajectories), this dataset 
captures movement information at the 
granularity of each user. However, 
location information is captured is at the 
level of cellular Base station association, 
which depending upon urban/rural areas 
can range from a few 100 meters to about 
5,000 meters. From a population of about 
11.6M users, we selected about 16K users 
that had more than 400 CDRs per day (i.e., 
>400 location samples and data accesses 
per day). While we use the taxicab dataset 
to analyze fine-grained trajectories (each 
corresponding to one trip), we use the 
cellular and enterprise dataset to analyze 
mobility across multiple trips undertaken 
by a single user. 
Figures 8-11 show the average anonymity 
as the extent of obfuscation is varied for 
times 7am-10am, 10am- 4pm, 4pm-7pm 
and 7pm-7am respectively. As the extent 
of obfuscation is increased so does the 
extent of anonymity; further anonymity is 
generally higher during busy hours in the 
morning and the evening because several 
mobile users are active within a small 
spatial extent. The key challenge in 
practice is that these measures of 
anonymities are averages over the 
respective dataset. Hence, given a user 
location at a point in date and time, the 
challenge is to identify the amount of 
obfuscation required to achieve a desired 
level of anonymity. 
Figure 12 shows the number of users on 
the y-axis and similarity on x-axis. A point 
(x, y) in the figure indicates that there are 
at least y users whose profiles have a 
similarity of at least x with a randomly 
selected user. Similarity between user 
profiles is computed using a cosine 
distance on the set of URLs (web pages) 
accessed by a user with that of another 
user. 
Figures 13, 14 and15 show the complexity 
of a device-based model and false positive 
and false negative rates in enforcing the 
desired level of anonymity. A choice of 
obfuscation k is said to result in a false 
positive if it results in cloaking < k users; 
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Fig 10     4- 7pm               Fig 11  7pm – 7am 
 
 
 
Fig 12 Similarity of user profiles (based on data 
accesses)  
 
 
 
Fig 13   Shanghai              Fig 14 Stockholm 
 
  
Fig 15 San Francisco        Fig 16 Shanghai 
 
 
Fig 17 Stockholm              Fig 18 San Francisco 
 
And in a false negative if it results in 
cloaking ≥ k users. A false negative is an 
indicator of over obfuscation, which would 
in turn affect the utility of the obfuscated 
data; while a false positive is in direct 
violation of the k-anonymity security 
requirement. In order to determine the 
level of obfuscation we analyzed historical 
data using decision tree based machine 
learning algorithms − parameterized by 
location (typically encoded as 
latitude/longitude boxes) and timestamps 
(typically time of day and week). We 
tradeoff model complexity (i.e., number of 
nodes in the decision tree) with accuracy 
(i.e., being able to predict the desired level 
of obfuscation). We observed that 
increasing the model complexity beyond a 
desired level increases the error primarily 
due to over fitting. We also noticed that in 
most cases the false positive and false 
negative rates of an optimal device-based 
algorithm (with large model complexity) 
varies between 0.12 and 0.25 for our 
datasets. This captures the extent of sub-
optimality in device-based solutions in 
comparison with an edge-based solution. 
Figures 16, 17 and18 show the false 
positive rate (i.e., the odds of not meeting 
the desired level of anonymity) and 
location error. Location error is only 
computed when the choice of obfuscation 
meets the desired level of anonymity. If 
the choice of obfuscation meets the desired 
level of anonymity and nothing more than 
location error is zero. Otherwise, location 
error is computed as the difference 
between the extent of obfuscation chosen 
and the optimal obfuscation needed to 
achieve the desired level of anonymity. 
 
 
  Fig 19 Cellular Thr 0.0.             Fig 20  Cellular Sim Thr 0.7 
 
      
Fig 21  Cellular Sim Thr 0.9      Fig 22 Shanghai Sim Thr 0.7 
 
Figures 19, 20 and21 shows the false 
positive rate (i.e., the probability of not 
meeting the desired level of anonymity) 
and location error with and without 
consideration to user similarity 
respectively. 
 
Fig 23 Stockholm Sim Thr 0.7        Fig 24 San Francisco Sim Thr 0.7 
 
For this experiment the desired level of 
anonymity k = 16 and the desired level of 
user similarity is 0.0 (first case that ignores 
user profiles), 0.7 (in the second case) and 
0.9 (in the third case). For instance when 
user similarity threshold is 0.7, amongst 
the set of users that are within the extent of 
obfuscation only those users whose 
profiles are at least 70% similar to the 
given user are considered for 
quantification of anonymity. This figure 
shows the additional cost (higher false 
positive rate and higher location error) that 
is incurred when enforcing location 
security based on profile cloning. We 
observed that when the similarity threshold 
is low the device-based solution pays a 
high penalty in terms of location error, 
while when the threshold is high the 
device- based solution pays a higher 
penalty in terms of false positive rate (i.e., 
the inability to meet the security 
requirement). 
Figures 22, 23 and24 show the false 
positive rate (i.e., the odds of not meeting 
the desired level of anonymity) and 
location error while requiring a user 
similarity threshold of 0.7. Profiles for 
entities are drawn at random from the 
Watson dataset with the goal of 
showcasing tradeoffs between location 
security and identity/profile based 
obfuscation. Similar to prior experiments, 
location error is only computed when the 
choice of obfuscation meets the desired 
level of anonymity. If the choice of 
obfuscation meets the desired level of 
anonymity and nothing more than location 
error is zero. Otherwise, location error is 
computed as the difference between the 
extent of obfuscation chosen and the 
optimal obfuscation needed to achieve the 
desired level of anonymity. 
 18. Android based implementation 
 
This work has been implemented as an 
android based system. An application has 
been implemented in the android device in 
order to showcase the difference in the two 
methodologies. The solution at the device 
and the solution at the edge have been 
implemented using an example of the 
London Boris bikes. Boris bikes are the 
easiest way to hire a cycle, ride it where 
you like and return it to any docking 
station. In this implementation, we have 
shown how the system level solution 
works when the solution is at the edge and 
when it’s at the device. In order to perform 
the implementation, we have made use of 
an application in an android device and 
then have implemented an edge server on a 
windows server. This server behaves as an 
edge, which has the visibility to all the 
devices in the network, and performs 
computations accordingly. The device 
based solution shows an android 
application with the map of London in it 
indicating the Boris bikes available for 
hire. Request from the mobile device is 
shown on the map by indicating the 
current location of the device. By 
performing obfuscation on the device, it 
can be noticed that the obfuscation is not 
accurate enough as the device does not 
have visibility to other devices in the 
network. When the user then makes a 
request for the bikes, the responses 
received are not accurate due to the 
drawback of inaccurate obfuscation. In the 
case of solution at the edge, the edge has 
visibility to all the devices. When the user 
makes a request asking for the nearest bike 
hire from the current location, the edge 
takes care of obfuscating the current 
location of the device in comparison with 
the other devices in the network that would 
have made similar requests. The request is 
then sent from the obfuscated location and 
this results in accurate responses for the 
user requesting the locations of the bikes 
nearby from his location. Figures show the 
different stages in the demonstration of the 
location-based request with the 
anonymized location and the results of the 
query. The solution has been implemented 
using the Eclipse development kit and has 
been tested with real use case scenarios. 
Figure 25 shows the device-based solution 
where the user clicks on a particular point 
and then checks are done to see if the 
chosen location has enough obfuscation.  
Device level obfuscation cannot be 
performed, as the device has no visibility 
to the other devices in the proximity. 
 
Fig 25   Device based solution view of the 
London Thames region 
Hence checks are done at the edge server 
to ensure that the obfuscation is good 
enough to make a query. Figure 26 shows 
the search results for Boris bike using the 
device-based solution.  
 
 
Fig 26 Search results for the device based 
solution 
 
Figure 27 shows the view that the edge 
server would have all the devices. Since 
the server can see all the devices, when a 
device makes a request for the bikes, the 
server can obfuscate the location based on 
the other devices in the area.  
 
Fig 27 Devices that are visible to the edge server 
 
 
Fig 28   Query results from true and obfuscated 
location 
On searching for the bikes based on the 
new obfuscated location, the results are 
displayed in Figure 28. The comparison of 
results based on the search from the true 
location and the obfuscated location is 
shown using the two circles. This proves 
that the edge server functions close enough 
to the query made directly to the Boris 
bikes provider without any obfuscation. 
 
19. Conclusion 
 
Preserving user privacy is a very 
challenging issue in the mobile 
environments.  Today’s mobile devices 
have become much more capable of doing 
things one would not have imagined 10 
years ago. With the location services and 
the capabilities of the applications in the 
mobile devices, service providers can 
personalize any type of service that one 
asks for, from finding a stolen phone 
anywhere in the world to providing all the 
latest information about a new restaurant 
opened in the neighborhood. The question 
is how one makes use of the location 
information of an individual user and how 
the privacy of the user information is 
preserved. This has been a question for 
researches for many years and the problem 
is getting worse day by day due to the 
change in privacy policies of major service 
providers like Google and Facebook who 
have actively harvested data over the last 
number of years and are now changing 
their polices to make use of these 
harvested data to deliver new personalized 
services to the customers. There are 
various solutions and mechanisms that 
have been provided and prototyped by 
many research groups and companies over 
the last several years.  However, due to the 
increasing connectivity between new 
services and the inter-dependency between 
the service providers is making the privacy 
management a challenging task for an 
innocent user of the mobile device. This 
review paper is an attempt to review all of 
the existing privacy preserving techniques 
that has been proposed for the mobile 
environments and identify some of the 
flaws in the existing techniques that needs 
to be overcome to make the mobile a safer 
and secure platform to transact and 
communicate in the future.  
We have explored both device and edge 
based enforcement of location security and 
quantified the gap between optimal device-
based enforcement with that of the edge-
based enforcement. In particular, we have 
identified machine-learning algorithms 
that determine the extent of location 
obfuscation that is needed to achieve a 
desired level of anonymity. We have 
shown that even with good models a 
device based solution (that is unaware of 
the instantaneous locations of other entities 
or their profiles) is largely suboptimal in 
determining the extent of location 
obfuscation. Our experiments on various 
mobility datasets show that device-based 
solutions either suffer from high false 
positive rate (about 25% chance of not 
meeting the desired security requirement) 
or low utility (about 600 meters higher 
error in obfuscated location data). 
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